

May 14, 2007

Mr. Mark B. Bezilla
Site Vice President
FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station
5501 North State Route 2
Oak Harbor, OH 43449-9760

SUBJECT: DAVIS-BESSE NUCLEAR POWER STATION
NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION BASELINE INSPECTION
INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2007006(DRS)

Dear Mr. Bezilla:

On April 5, 2007, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) completed an inspection at your Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The enclosed inspection report documents the inspection results, which were discussed on April 5, 2007, with Mr. V. Kaminskis and other members of your staff.

As a result of your intent to adopt the National Fire Protection Association Standard (NFPA) 805 code, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition," as defined by Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Part 50, Section 48(c), the inspection was conducted in accordance with Inspection Procedure 71111.05TTP, "Fire Protection - NFPA 805 Transition Period (Triennial)," dated May 9, 2006. The inspection examined activities conducted under your license, as they relate to safety and to compliance with the Commission's rules and regulations, and with the conditions of your license. The inspectors reviewed selected procedures and records, observed activities, and interviewed personnel.

Based on the results of this inspection, no findings of significance were identified.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.390 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be available electronically for public inspection in the NRC Public Document Room or from the Publicly Available Records System (PARS) component of NRC's Agencywide

M. Bezilla

-2-

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Sincerely,

/RA/

Julio F. Lara, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Docket No. 50-346
License No. NFP-3

Enclosure: Inspection Report 05000346/2007006
w/Attachment: Supplemental Information

cc w/encl: The Honorable Dennis Kucinich
J. Hagan, President and Chief
Nuclear Officer - FENOC
J. Lash, Senior Vice President of
Operations and Chief Operating Officer
Richard Anderson, Vice President, Nuclear Support
Manager - Site Regulatory Compliance
D. Pace, Senior Vice President of
of Fleet Engineering
J. Rinckel, Vice President, Fleet Oversight
D. Jenkins, Attorney, FirstEnergy
Director, Fleet Regulatory Affairs
Manager - Fleet Licensing
Ohio State Liaison Officer
R. Owen, Administrator, Ohio Department of Health
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
President, Lucas County Board of Commissioners
President, Ottawa County Board of Commissioners

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D. Jenkins, Attorney, FirstEnergy
Director, Fleet Regulatory Affairs
Manager - Fleet Licensing
Ohio State Liaison Officer
R. Owen, Administrator, Ohio Department of Health
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio
President, Lucas County Board of Commissioners
President, Ottawa County Board of Commissioners

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M. Bezilla

-3-

Letter to Mr. Mark Bezilla from Mr. Julio Lara dated May 14, 2007.

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NRC TRIENNIAL FIRE PROTECTION BASELINE INSPECTION
INSPECTION REPORT 05000346/2007006(DRS)

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III

Docket No: 50-346

License No: NPF-3

Report No: 05000346/2007006(DRS)

Licensee: FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company

Facility: Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

Location: Oak Harbor, OH

Dates: March 12 through April 5, 2007

Inspectors: R. Langstaff, Senior Reactor Inspector, Lead
M. Munir, Reactor Inspector
D. Szwarc, Reactor Inspector

Approved by: Julio F. Lara, Chief
Engineering Branch 3
Division of Reactor Safety

Enclosure

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

IR 05000346/2007006(DRS); 03/12/07 - 04/05/07; Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station; Routine Triennial Fire Protection Baseline Inspection.

This report covers an announced triennial fire protection baseline inspection. The inspection was conducted by Region III inspectors. The significance of most findings is indicated by their color (Green, White, Yellow, Red) using Inspection Manual Chapter (IMC) 0609, "Significance Determination Process" (SDP). Findings for which the SDP does not apply may be "Green" or be assigned a severity level after NRC management review. The NRC's program for overseeing the safe operation of commercial nuclear power reactors is described in NUREG-1649, "Reactor Oversight Process," Revision 3; dated July 2000.

A. Inspector-Identified and Self-Revealed Findings

Cornerstone: Initiating Events

No findings of significance were identified.

Cornerstone: Mitigating Systems

No findings of significance were identified.

B. Licensee-Identified Violations

No findings of significance were identified.

REPORT DETAILS

1. REACTOR SAFETY

Cornerstones: Initiating Events and Mitigating Systems

1R05 Fire Protection (71111.05TTP)

FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company (FENOC), the licensee, in a letter to the U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) dated February 27, 2007, committed to adopt the National Fire Protection Association Standard (NFPA) 805 code, "Performance-Based Standard for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants, 2001 Edition," as defined by 10 CFR 50.48(c) for the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station. The NFPA 805 code establishes a comprehensive set of requirements for fire protection programs at nuclear power plants. The code incorporated both deterministic and risk-informed, performance-based concepts. The deterministic aspects of the code are comparable to traditional requirements. However, the transition to a risk-informed, performance-based fire protection program requires an in-depth nuclear safety circuit analysis for equipment identified for nuclear safety functions such as safe shutdown. Because the conversion and licensing process to NFPA 805 was expected to identify and address a variety of issues that were normally the subject of the triennial fire protection baseline inspection, the NRC modified the fire protection inspection program and Enforcement Policy for licensees in transition to NFPA 805. As a result, this inspection was conducted in accordance with IP 71111.05TTP, "Fire Protection - NFPA 805 Transition Period (Triennial)," dated May 9, 2006. Associated with the transition to NFPA 805, when a circuit-related finding not associated with a finding of high safety significance meets the four criteria established by Section A of the NRC's Interim Enforcement Policy Regarding Enforcement Discretion for Certain Fire Protection Issues (10 CFR 50.48), the violation would receive enforcement discretion in accordance with the NRC's Enforcement Policy.

The purpose of this inspection was to review the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Fire Protection Program for selected risk-significant fire areas. Emphasis was placed on determining that the post-fire safe shutdown capability and the fire protection features were maintained free of fire damage to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available. The inspection was performed in accordance with the NRC's regulatory oversight process using a risk-informed approach for selecting the fire areas and attributes to be inspected. The inspectors used the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Individual Plant Examination for External Events to choose several risk-significant areas for detailed inspection and review. The fire zones chosen for review during this inspection are listed below and constitute five samples:

Fire Areas	Description
DD	Cable Spreading Room;
FF	Control Room;
HH	Control Room Ventilation;
Q	High Voltage Switchgear Room, Division 2; and
X	Low Voltage Switchgear Room, Division 2.

For each of these fire areas, the inspection focused on the fire protection features, the systems and equipment necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions, determination of license commitments, and changes to the Fire Protection Program.

.1 Shutdown from Outside Main Control Room

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1, required that structures, systems, and components that were necessary to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown from outside the main control room be protected by fire protection features, such that, one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions was free of fire damage; and systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown could be repaired within 72 hours.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the functional requirements identified by the licensee as necessary for achieving and maintaining hot shutdown conditions to ensure that at least one post-fire safe shutdown success path was available in the event of fire in each of the selected fire areas and for alternative shutdown in the case of control room evacuation. The inspectors reviewed the plant systems required to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions for each fire area selected for review. Specifically, the review was performed to determine the adequacy of the systems selected for reactivity control, reactor coolant inventory makeup, reactor heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions. The review also included the fire Safe Shutdown Analysis to ensure that all required components in the selected systems were included in the licensee's Safe Shutdown Analysis.

The inspectors reviewed the Safe Shutdown Analysis, licensee operating procedures, piping and instrumentation drawings, electrical drawings, the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station Updated Final Safety Analysis Report (UFSAR) and other supporting documents to verify that hot and cold shutdown could be achieved and maintained from outside the control room for fires that rely on shutdown from outside the control room. This review included verification that shutdown from outside the control room could be performed both with and without the availability of offsite power.

The inspectors also reviewed the operators' ability to perform the necessary manual actions for achieving safe shutdown by reviewing procedures, the accessibility of safe shutdown equipment, and the available time for performing the actions.

The inspectors reviewed the Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station UFSAR and the licensee's engineering and/or licensing justifications (e.g., NRC guidance documents, license amendments, Technical Specifications, Safety Evaluation Reports, exemptions, and deviations) to determine the licensing basis.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.2 Protection of Safe Shutdown Capabilities

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1, required the licensee to provide fire protection features that were capable of limiting fire damage to systems, structures, and components important to safe shutdown. The systems, structures, and components that were necessary to achieve and maintain post-fire safe shutdown were required to be protected by fire protection features that were capable of limiting fire damage to the systems, structures, and components so that:

- one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions from either the control room or emergency control station(s) was free of fire damage; and
- systems necessary to achieve and maintain cold shutdown from either the control room or emergency control station(s) could be repaired within 72 hours.

Specific design features for ensuring this capability were specified by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the fire hazards analysis, safe shutdown analysis and supporting drawings and documentation to verify that safe shutdown capabilities were properly protected. Under the NFPA 805 transition period inspection period, the inspectors were to validate 1 to 3 non-conformances identified in the licensee's transitional assessment of their fire areas. At the time of this inspection, no fire areas had been assessed by the licensee.

The inspectors reviewed the licensee procedures and programs for the control of ignition sources and transient combustibles to assess their effectiveness in preventing fires and in controlling combustible loading within limits established in the fire hazards analysis. The inspectors performed plant walkdowns to verify that protective features were being properly maintained and administrative controls were being implemented.

The inspectors also reviewed the licensee's design control procedures to ensure that the process included appropriate reviews and controls to assess plant changes for any potential adverse impact on the fire protection program and/or post-fire safe shutdown analysis and procedures.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.3 Passive Fire Protection

Branch Technical Position APCS 9.5-1, Section IV.B.1, "General Guidelines for Plant Protection Building Design," Section IV.B.3, "Cable Construction, Cable Trays and Penetrations," and Section IV.D.2, "Control Room," identified the requirements for the licensee's fire protection passive features.

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire area barriers, penetration seals, fire doors, electrical raceway fire barriers, and fire rated electrical cables. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed barriers, seals, doors, and cables. The inspectors compared the as-installed configurations to the approved construction details and supporting fire tests. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license documentation, such as NRC Safety Evaluation Reports, and deviations from NRC regulations and the NFPA codes to verify that fire protection features met license commitments.

The inspectors walked down accessible portions of the selected fire areas to observe material condition and the adequacy of design of fire area boundaries (including walls, fire doors, and fire dampers) to ensure they were appropriate for the fire hazards in the area.

The inspectors reviewed the installation, repair, and qualification records for a sample of penetration seals to ensure the fill material was of the appropriate fire rating and that the installation met the engineering design.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.4 Active Fire Protection

Branch Technical Position APCS 9.5-1, Section IV.C.1, "Fire Detection," Section IV.C.3, "Water Sprinkler and Hose Standpipe Systems," Section IV.C.5, "Carbon Dioxide Suppression Systems," and Section IV.D.2, "Control Room," identified the requirements for the licensee's fire protection active features.

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors evaluated the adequacy of fire suppression and detection systems. The inspectors observed the material condition and configuration of the installed fire detection and suppression systems. The inspectors reviewed design documents and supporting calculations. In addition, the inspectors reviewed license basis documentation, such as NRC Safety Evaluation Reports, and

deviations from NRC regulations and the NFPA codes to verify that fire suppression and detection systems met license commitments.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.5 Protection from Damage from Fire Suppression Activities

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, Criterion 3, "Fire Protection," required that firefighting systems shall be designed to minimize the adverse effects of fires on systems, structures, and components important to safety and to assure that their rupture or inadvertent operation does not significantly impair the safety capability of these systems, structures, and components.

a. Inspection Scope

For the selected fire areas, the inspectors verified that redundant trains of systems required for hot shutdown would not be subject to damage from fire suppression activities or from the rupture or inadvertent operation of fire suppression systems including the effects of flooding. The inspectors conducted walkdowns of each of the selected fire areas to assess conditions, such as the adequacy and condition of floor drains, equipment elevations and spray protection.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.6 Alternative Shutdown Capability

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1, required that systems, structures, and components important to safe shutdown be provided with fire protection features capable of limiting fire damage to ensure that one train of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions was free of fire damage. Options for providing this level of fire protection were delineated in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Where the protection of systems whose function was required for hot shutdown did not satisfy 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, an alternative or dedicated shutdown capability independent of the area under consideration was required to be provided. Additionally, alternative or dedicated shutdown capability must be able to achieve and maintain hot standby conditions and achieve cold shutdown conditions within 72 hours and maintain cold shutdown conditions thereafter. During the post-fire safe shutdown, the reactor coolant process variables must remain within those predicted for a loss of normal ac power, and the fission product boundary integrity must not be affected (i.e., no fuel clad damage, rupture of any primary coolant boundary, or rupture of the containment boundary).

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's systems required to achieve alternative safe shutdown to determine if the licensee had properly identified the components and systems necessary to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions. The inspectors also focused on the adequacy of the systems to perform reactor pressure control, reactivity control, reactor coolant makeup, decay heat removal, process monitoring, and support system functions.

The inspectors performed a walkdown of a sample of the actions defined in Procedure DB-OP-02519, "Serious Control Room Fire." The team conducted the walkdown to determine if operators could reasonably be expected to perform the procedure actions and that equipment labeling was consistent with the procedure. The review also looked at operator training as well as consistency between the operations shutdown procedures and any associated administrative controls. The inspectors' review of the adequacy of emergency lighting associated with these procedures are documented in Section 1R05.9 of this report.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.7 Circuit Analyses

a. Inspection Scope

In accordance with Inspection Procedure 71111.05TTP, "Fire Protection - NFPA 805 Transition Period (Triennial)," dated May 9, 2006, this section of the IP was suspended for facilities in NFPA 805 transition.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.8 Communications

Branch Technical Position APCS 9.5-1, required that emergency communication equipment be provided. For a fire in an alternative shutdown fire area, control room evacuation may be required and a shutdown is performed from outside the control room. Radio communications are relied upon to coordinate the shutdown of both units and for fire fighting.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed, on a sample bases, the adequacy of the communication system to support plant personnel in the performance of alternative safe shutdown functions and fire brigade duties.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.9 Emergency Lighting

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.J., required that emergency lighting units with at least an eight-hour battery power supply be provided in all areas needed for operation of safe shutdown equipment and in access and egress routes thereto.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors performed a plant walkdown of areas in which a sample of the actions would be performed as described in procedure DB-OP-02519, "Serious Control Room Fire." As part of the walkdowns, the inspectors focused on the existence of sufficient emergency lighting for access and egress to areas and for performing necessary equipment operations.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.10 Cold Shutdown Repairs

Title 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.1.b, required that equipment and systems comprising the means to achieve and maintain cold shutdown conditions should not be damaged by fire; or the fire damage to such equipment and systems should be limited so that the systems can be made operable and cold shutdown achieved within 72 hours. Materials for such repairs shall be readily available onsite and procedures shall be in effect to implement such repairs.

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's procedures to determine whether repairs were required to achieve cold shutdown and to verify that dedicated repair procedures, equipment, and material to accomplish those repairs were available on-site. The inspectors also evaluated whether cold shutdown could be achieved within the required time using the licensee's procedures and repair methods.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

.11 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors conducted a review to verify that compensatory measures were in place for out-of-service, degraded or inoperable fire protection and post-fire safe shutdown

equipment, systems, or features (e.g., detection and suppression systems and equipment, passive fire barriers, pumps, valves or electrical devices providing safe shutdown functions or capabilities). The inspectors also conducted a review on the adequacy of short term compensatory measures to compensate for a degraded function or feature until appropriate corrective actions were taken.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4. OTHER ACTIVITIES

4OA2 Identification and Resolution of Problems

a. Inspection Scope

The inspectors reviewed the corrective action program procedures and samples of corrective action documents to verify that the licensee was identifying issues related to the fire protection program at an appropriate threshold and entering them in the corrective action program. The inspectors reviewed selected samples of condition reports, work orders, design packages, and fire protection system non-conformance documents.

b. Findings

No findings of significance were identified.

4OA6 Meetings

.1 Exit Meeting

On April 5, 2007, at the conclusion of the on-site inspection activities, the inspectors presented preliminary inspection results to Mr. V. Kaminskis and other members of licensee management. The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

ATTACHMENT: SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION

KEY POINTS OF CONTACT

Licensee

V. Kaminskas, Director, Site Operations
J. Grabner, Director, Station Engineering
R. Hruby, Jr., Manager, Fleet Oversight
A. Miller, System Engineer, Fire Protection
D. Moul, Manager, Plant Operations
M. Murtha, Fire Protection Engineer, Design Engineering
V. Patton, Fire Marshal
C. Price, Director, Performance Improvement
D. Wuokko, Manager, Regulatory Compliance
G. Wolf, Engineer, Regulatory Compliance

NRC

J. Lara, Chief, Engineering Branch 3, Region III
R. Smith, Resident Inspector, Davis-Besse Nuclear Power Station

LIST OF ITEMS OPENED, CLOSED, AND DISCUSSED

Opened, Closed, and Discussed

None

LIST OF DOCUMENTS REVIEWED

The following is a list of documents reviewed during the inspection. Inclusion on this list does not imply that the NRC team reviewed the documents in their entirety, but rather, that selected sections of portions of the documents were evaluated as part of the overall inspection effort. Inclusion of a document on this list does not imply NRC acceptance of the document or any part of it, unless this is stated in the body of the inspection report.

Calculations

15.49; Automatic Suppression System Flow Rates for Drainage; Revision 0

15.50; Evaluation of Fire Suppression System Impact on Auxiliary Bldg. and Intake Structure; Revision 1

C-EE-013.10-001; 480 V Breaker Coordination to Meet Common Power Source Criteria for Appendix R; Revision 3

C-FP-013.10-006; Appendix 12, Combustible Loading Calculation; Revision 4

Condition Reports

03-03152; Fire Detection Coverage Concerns for Rooms 429Aa and 429B; dated April 24, 2003

04-05703; During NRC Inspection Activity in the Component Cooling Water Pump Room a Sprinkler Head was Observed to Have Evidence of past Leakage; dated September 16, 2004

04-05725; There is an Abnormal Noise Coming from FP 1055; dated September 19, 2004

04-05886; Door 406 (Door to SFP Corridor from East Hallway in the RRA) was Found to be Approximately 8 Inches Open at 0810, 1420, and 1545 on September 25, 2004; dated September 25, 2004

04-05970; Fire Area HH Appendix R, Exemption Request; dated September 28, 2004

05-01999; Fire Valve FP123 the North Underground Loop to Turbine Building Loop Isolation Was Found to be Leaking While Performing DB-FP-04031 Quarterly Fire Valve Alignment Verification; dated April 2, 2005

05-03695; EDG Room 2 Pre-Action Valve Pressure Switch; dated July 2, 2005

05-04150; the Question has been Asked as to Where a Fire Brigade Member Can Go, Particularly Outside the Protected Area, and Still Meet Any Requirements for Responding to a Fire; dated August 2, 2005

05-04323; NRC Issued Non-cited Violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III. J; dated June 21, 2005

06-00271; Drawings M-341 Sh. 2 of 3, M-362 Sh. 1 of 3, and M-362 Sh. 2 of 3 Show Sprinkler Head Labeled as U03 Being a Pendant Sprinkler; dated February 1, 2006

06-00531; the NRC Resident Reported that Door 306 Was Found Approximately 2 to 3 Inches Open; dated March 1, 2006

06-01027; Notified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Resident Inspector that Door 206, AB2 Southeast Stairwell-AUX Bldg, was Found ajar; dated March 17, 2006

06-01224; Door 406 had a New Closer Installed under Order 200194334 and Failed Test DB-FP-04036; dated March 23, 2006

06-02227; Failure of Flanged Joint on Cable Spread Room Sprinkler Header; dated May 6, 2006

06-03389; Received Notification from the NRC Resident Inspector Door 308 did not Fully Latch without Assistance when He Passed Through the Door; dated September 5, 2006

06-07330; Found 2 Unidentified Penetrations in Room 240-F (Floor); dated October 5, 2006

07-14222; Db-ss-06-38: Hose Station Calcs. Not Signed nor Issued; dated February 8, 2007

Condition Reports Initiated as a Result of Inspection

07-16265; Door 317 Will Not Close and Latch from 1/4 Open; dated March 15, 2007

07-16296; NRC FP Triennial Inspection Procedure Issue DB-OP-02519; dated March 15, 2007

07-16308; During the NRC Triennial Fire Protection Inspection the Inspectors Noted a Concern with the Installation of DAAS Units in the Control Room Cabinet Room; dated March 14, 2007

07-16318; During the NRC Fire Protection Triennial Inspection the Inspectors Expressed a Concern over the Use of Neoprene Insulation in Room 603 Control Room Heating Ventilation and Air Conditioning; dated March 15, 2007

07-17553; a Walkdown by the NRC Found a Small Amount of Transient Combustibles Left on the Top of a Health Physics Department Cabinet in the Center of Corridor 227; dated April 4, 2007

07-17589; FHAR Wording Relating to the Radio Repeater; dated April 4, 2007

07-17722; During the Exit of the Fire Protection Triennial Inspection the Inspectors Made an Observation Concerning the "Temporary" Installation in the Control Room of the ICS DAAS; dated April 5, 2007

07-18037; During the Exit Meeting for the NRC Fire Protection Triennial Inspection (April 5, 2007), the Lead Inspector Provided an Observation on the Control of Combustibles Program; dated April 5, 2007

Correspondence

Serial Number 3003; Request for Exemption from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3 for Fire Area HH; dated January 20, 2004

Serial Number 3076; Supplemental Information Regarding the Request for Exemption from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3 for Fire Area HH (TAC No. MC1833); dated September 3, 2004

Serial Number 3106; Supplemental Information Regarding the Request for Exemption from 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.3 for Fire Area HH (TAC No. MC1833); dated February 25, 2005

Drawings

E-6 Sh 1; 480 VAC MCC (Essential) One Line Diagram; Revision 81

E-45b Sh-11A; Elementary Wiring Diagram Afpt and Mfpt Control and Auxiliaries Afpt Control; Revision 14

E-45b Sh-11B; Elementary Wiring Diagram Afpt and Mfpt Control and Auxiliaries Afpt Control; Revision 16

E-45b Sh-11C; Elementary Wiring Diagram Afpt and Mfpt Control and Auxiliaries Afpt Control; Revision 5

E-52b Sh 12; Elementary Wiring Diagrams Reactor Cooling System RC Przr Pwr Rlf Shutoff Vlv; Revision 13

E-892, Sh 3; Raceway-Fire Alarm System Auxiliary Building Plan Elev. 613' - 6"; Revision 4

M-360, Sh 3; Fire Protection Piping Sprinkler System Rm. 422A Auxiliary Building Elev. 613'-6"; Revision 1

Fire Protection Program Documents

Fire Hazards Analysis; Revision 21

NG-DB-00302; DBNPS Fire Protection Program; dated August 24, 2005

Licensee Assessments

DB-C-06-02; Davis-Besse Fleet Oversight Quarterly Assessment Report; dated July 28, 2006

DB-SS-06-038; Fire Protection Triennial Inspection Readiness; dated March 12, 2007

Procedures

DB-FP-00007; Control of Transient Combustibles; Revision 8

DB-OP-02519; Serious Control Room Fire; Revision 11

DB-OP-02501; Serious Station Fire, Attachment 20: Fire in Area Hh; Revision 12

PFP-AB-422A; Protected Area Pre-Fire Plan: Cable Spreading Room 422A Fire Area DD; Revision 3

PFP-AB-323; Protected Area Pre-Fire Plan: High Voltage Switchgear Room B Room 323 Fire Area Q; Revision 4

PFP-AB-428; Protected Area Pre-Fire Plan: Low Voltage Switchgear Room F-bus Room 428 Fire Area X; Revision 3

PFP-AB-505; Protected Area Pre-Fire Plan: Control Room and Adjacent Support Rooms; Revision 6

PFP-AB-603; Protected Area Pre-Fire Plan: Ac Equipment Room and Records and Storage Area; Revision 3

Surveillances and Tests

DB-FP-04014; Periodic Test Procedure Fire Hose Station Inspections; dated March 07, 2007

DB-FP-04015; Periodic Test Procedure Fire Hose Hydrostatic Tests, Rerack, and Visual Inspections; Dated November 17, 2006

DB-FP-04016; Fire Extinguisher Quarterly Inspection; Performed February 26, 2007

DB-FP-04028; Appendix a Fire Door 18 Month Inspection; Dated August 3, 2005

DB-MI-04813-001; Supervisory and Functional Test for Node 3 C3520; dated January 26, 2006

DB-MI-04813-001; Supervisory and Functional Test for Node 3 C3520; dated February 23, 2005

DB-MI-04814-001; Supervisory and Functional Test for Node 4 C4520; dated December 12, 2005

DB-MI-04818-001; Supervisory and Functional Test of Detectors for Node 8 C6713; dated October 21, 2005

DB-MI-04819; Supervisory and Functional Test of Accessible Detectors for Node 9 C5796A; Dated September 22, 2006

Davis-Besse, Appendix R, Radio Communications Study; Revision 2

Appendix R Emergency Lighting Checklist; Room No. 237, AUX Feed Pump Room; dated May 3, 1989

Appendix R Emergency Lighting Checklist; Room No. 428, Low Voltage Switchgear Room F Bus; dated May 3, 1989

Temporary Modifications

04-0005; Cabinets for ICS, NNI, EHC, and CRDT; dated October 27, 2004

List of Acronyms Used

ADAMS	Agencywide Documents Access and Management System
APCSB	Auxiliary and Power Conversion Systems Branch
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
DRS	Division of Reactor Safety
FENOC	FirstEnergy Nuclear Operating Company
IMC	Inspection Manual Chapter
IP	Inspection Procedure
NFPA	National Fire Protection Association
NRC	U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PARS	Publicly Available Records
SDP	Significance Determination Process
UFSAR	Updated Final Safety Analysis Report